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price, is the best indicator of market value." 9 The fact that the
property had been for sale for many years, that this was the
highest offer ever received, and that sales under the option
agreement were consummated before and after the assessment
date, was sufficient, in the absence of contrary evidence, to
establish the arm's-length nature of the transaction.
The court, however, was quick to point out that this does
not mean that an option price will always indicate fair market
value. Where, for example, changing conditions after the op-
tion agreement, result in an uncontemplated increase in mar-
ket value, the option price may be an inappropriate measure
of value. The court also notes that some "unscrupulous individ-
uals" might attempt to establish a lower tax assessment with
a contrived option to purchase agreement. However, the fact
that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show an arm's-
length transaction should provide an adequate safeguard."
RANDY S. NELSON
TORTS
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INFORMED CONSENT
The standard of care required of physicians under Wiscon-
sin's informed consent doctrine was modified during this term
of court in Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.I The trial
court upheld a jury verdict that respondent-doctors were negli-
gent in failing to adequately inform the plaintiff-patient of the
risks involved before the performance of a percutaneous fe-
moral aortogram. The jury also held, however, that the doctors'
negligence was not causal of the plaintiff's injuries, and judg-
ment was entered against the plaintiff. As part of the opera-
tion, a dye was injected into the aorta through a catheter in-
serted in the groin so that the arteries leading to the kidneys
could be visualized by X-rays. There was considerable dispute
in the testimony as to what was actually told Scaria with re-
spect to the risks of the procedure. Although Scaria did sign a
29. 68 Wis. 2d at 734, 229 N.W.2d at 589.
30. Id. at 737, 229 N.W.2d at 591.
1. 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).
2. Id. at 6, 7, 227 N.W.2d at 650, 651.
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consent to operate form, the jury found the disclosures to be
inadequate. Plaintiff lost the causation issue and appealed.
The propriety of the trial court's jury instructions was the
critical issue on appeal.' The plaintiff asserted two grounds for
error. First, a sentence in the instruction which limited a physi-
cian's disclosure responsibility to only those factors which phy-
sicians of good standing would make under similar circum-
stances, was alleged to be impermissibly broad. Second, the
causation instruction was criticized as improper in its require-
ment that the jury apply an objective rather than a subjective
standard.
The supreme court found that the instructions regarding a
physician's duty to advise a patient of the hazards attendant
to proposed treatment were impermissibly broad since they
limited this duty to "the customs of a profession." The su-
preme court found that the custom, in this case, was the stan-
dard adopted by physicians and surgeons as a group. The issue
was: to what standard are physicians held when disclosing to
a patient the risks inherent in a proposed procedure. Before
enumerating what they believed to be the proper standard, the
court criticized the "professional standard limitation" on a
physician's duty to disclose risks in informed consent cases.
The court listed several reasons for the inadequacy of using
a professional standard in the exercise of the physician's duty
3. The trial court's instruction on the questions of a physician's duty to disclose
and causation was:
With respect to your answer to the question inquiring as to the negligence of Dr.
Kamper, Question No. 1, you are instructed that a physician and surgeon has a
duty to make reasonable disclosure to his patient of all significant facts under
the circumstances of the situation which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent and informed consent by the patient to the proposed treatment or
operation and the patient must have given such consent to the treatment or
operation. This duty, however, is limited to those disclosures which physicians
and surgeons of good standing would make under the same or similar circum-
stances, having due regard to the patient's physical, mental and emotional
condition.
Now, with respect to your answer to Question No. 2, inquiring as to the causal
negligence of Dr. Kamper, you are instructed that if you find that the defendant
Dr. Kamper did not reasonably disclose to the plaintiff K.S. Scaria all of the
significant facts, then you are instructed that there must be a causal relation-
ship between the physician's failure to adequately divulge and damage to the
plaintiff. A causal relationship exists only when disclosure of significant risks
incidental to treatment would have resulted in a decision against it. There is a
causal connection only if it has been established that had the plaintiff been so
informed, that then he would have declined the treatment as proposed.
Id. at 10, 227 N.W.2d at 652.
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to inform a patient of the risks of a proposed treatment. First,
the court noted that the right of the patient to be informed of
risks before consenting to medical treatment and the duty of
the doctor to advise the patient of risks indigenous to that
treatment were "standards" already recognized under the law.
Determination of such rights and duties was therefore not de-
pendent entirely on the customs of a given profession. Second,
the court asserted that a patient's lack of professional knowl-
edge generally prevented him from reaching a rational decision
to accept or refuse the proposed treatment unless he had been
first "reasonably informed by the doctor of the inherent and
potential risks,"' in the treatment. Finally, the court held that
if the duty to disclose to a patient the potential and inherent
risks of a proposed treatment were limited to a professional
standard (the court continually referred to this as the "customs
of a profession") that standard might, in some cases, be nonex-
istent or inadequate to meet the informational needs of a pa-
tient.
After its holding that the professional standard was an in-
adequate standard of care in the exercise of the doctor's duty
to inform his patient, the court stated:
In short, the duty of the doctor is to make such disclosures
as appear reasonably necessary under the circumstances then
existing to enable a reasonable person under the same or
similar circumstances confronting the patient at the time of
disclosure to intelligently exercise his right to consent or to
refuse the treatment or procedure proposed.5
While thus modifying the standard, Scaria did hold that what
advice is or is not customarily given will be relevant evidence.
In rejecting the prior standard of care with respect to the
physician's duty to disclose, the Scaria court did recognize that
the duty was limited in certain respects:
1. Doctors were not required to give detailed technical ex-
planations.
2. Doctors were not required to disclose risks that were ap-
parent or extremely remote;
3. Emergency situations limited the disclosure require-
ments; and
4. Required disclosures were limited where the patient is
4. Id. at 12, 227 N.W.2d at 653.
5. Id. at 13, 227 N.W.2d at 654.
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
either a child, mentally incompetent or emotionally dis-
traught or susceptible to unreasonable fears.
In practical terms, it appears that the Scaria court has said
that the doctor must inform his patient of all risks, except in
cases where one or more of the previously-mentioned limita-
tions apply.
The appellant's second criticism was the trial court's in-
struction on the question of causation.' Before a plaintiff may
recover under the informed consent theory of negligence, a cau-
sal relationship must be established between the doctor's fail-
ure to disclose significant risks incident to the treatment and
the patient's decision to elect surgery. The patient must show
that if he had been informed of the dangers of the procedure,
he would have decided against the treatment.7 The second crit-
icism thus questioned whether the determination of that fac-
tual question should be based on an objective or subjective
standard.
Under the objective standard, the causation issue is ana-
lyzed in terms of what a prudent person in the patient's posi-
tion would have decided if suitably informed of all significant
perils.' Under the subjective standard, the issue is resolved
based on whether the factfinder believes the patient's testi-
mony that he would not have agreed to the treatment if he had
known of the dangers which later ripened into an injury.' The
plaintiff argued that the question of causation calls for a
subjective determination since a patient should have the right
to make his own decisions for whatever reasons he alone may
deem appropriate. In essence, however, if the subjective stan-
dard were adopted the only way it could be shown that the
patient would not have elected the treatment would be through
the plaintiff's own testimony. Thus, it would appear, that if the
subjective standard were adopted, the causation question
would be resolved on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's credibil-
ity.
Prior to Scaria the law in Wisconsin on the causation issue
was somewhat unclear. Scaria appears to have resolved the
6. 68 Wis. 2d at 6-7, 227 N.W.2d at 650, 651.
7. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
8. 68 Wis. 2d at 14, 227 N.W.2d at 654, citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
790-791 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
9. Id.
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issue. The court rejected the subjective standard and unequi-
vocally adopted the objective. The court reasoned that:
[T]he objective, reasonable man approach is more workable
and more fair in that it allows the jury to consider the plain-
tiffs testimony as to how he would have responded without
being forced to engage solely in a test of the credibility of the
plaintiff's hindsight after an undesirable result.'"
In another case this term, Platta v. Flatley" demonstrated
one of the limitations on disclosure in informed consent situa-
tions as put forth by the court in Scaria v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co..,2 Platta involved the nature of a doctor's duty
to inform the patient of risks where those risks were reasonably
apparent. In Platta, a welcome-wagon promotion planner, who
was required to spend most of her day on her feet, sued her
doctor for permanent injury to her feet as a result of surgery
performed on them. The trial court entered judgment on the
jury verdict for the physician and the patient appealed. The
issue was whether there was any credible evidence to support
the jury finding. The court found that there were two points
upon which there was undisputed testimony as to nondisclo-
sure: that the plaintiff might possibly have to take pain-killing
medication; and that there was a possibility that the plaintiff
would be unable to continue in her business.
Plaintiff contended that since the doctor failed to ade-
quately advise her of the risks of the proposed surgery and had
no explanations for such failure, he must be found negligent as
a matter of law. The court felt that both instances of nondisclo-
sure were arguably dangers of which persons of average sophis-
tication were aware."3 Thus, an issue for the jury was created.
The court affirmed on the basis that it was reasonable for the
jury to conclude that the two instances of nondisclosure did not
amount to inadequate disclosure by the defendant.
I. STRICT AND STATUTORY LIABILITY.
A. Safe Place Statute
In Kaiser v. Cook, 4 a racetrack spectator was injured by a
10. 68 Wis. 2d at 15, 227 N.W.2d at 655.
11. 68 Wis. 2d 47, 207 N.W.2d 898 (1975).
12. 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).
13. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
14. 67 Wis. 2d 460, 227 N.W.2d 50 (1975).
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tire which flew off one of the race cars. The tire hurtled a ten
foot fence which separated a tiered slope at one end of the oval
from the track itself. The track was unique among racetracks
in the area in that race patrons were allowed to drive their cars
onto this slope from which vantage they might enjoy the race
seated in their own car or by standing or sitting about the
parked vehicle. Although several instances of flying debris oc-
curred each year and the track owner himself admitted that the
turn adjacent to the carpark was the worst place for wheels
going over the fence, no signs had been posted directing specta-
tors to remain in their cars. At the time plaintiff was injured
she was standing next to her auto.
The jury found for the plaintiff upon her safe place action,
attributing 80 percent of the causal negligence to the defendant
and 20 percent to Mrs. Kaiser. On motions after the verdict,
the trial court directed a jury verdict for the defendant; the
supreme court reversed.
Viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, the jury finding of
negligence was supported by sufficient record evidence to sus-
tain the verdict. Defendant, Cook, had breached his statutory
obligation when he knowingly permitted his patrons to view the
race from a dangerous area of the track. Cook appreciated the
danger from airborne race debris, yet had posted no warning
signs. Further, the Cedar Lake Speedway was unusual in allow-
ing spectators to remain in the turn areas, while other local
tracks did not, and evidence of this practice permitted the jury
to draw an inference that the defendant's race track was not
operated as safely as it could have been. Evidence of a devia-
tion from a custom observed in the trade, the court said, was
admissible to impose liability in safe-place cases.
Defendant unsuccessfully relied on Powless v. Milwaukee
County,'5 for the proposition that the spectator's negligence
exceeded that of the defendant as a matter of law. The court
found this precedent inapposite for two reasons. First, the ap-
portionment of negligence as between the parties is ordinarily
a question for the jury and will only rarely be determined as a
matter of law. Second, Powless was distinguishable from the
present case because Mrs. Kaiser had not realized the danger
of viewing the race from the slope and she had been watching
the race closely immediately prior to the accident. In Powless,
15. 6 Wis. 2d 78, 94 N.W.2d 187 (1959).
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a baseball spectator chose to sit in an unprotected part of the
stadium although she was well aware that foul balls were fre-
quently hit into that area. Despite her knowledge of the danger,
she was not paying attention to the game when the accident
occurred. Thus, the Powless decision reflected more than a
mere adherence to the assumption of risk doctrine, a defense
which is inapplicable under Wisconsin's safe-place statute.,6
These distinctions drawn by the court point out the signifi-
cance, for purposes of apportionment of negligence, of the facts
and circumstances in maintaining sports-spectator safe-place
actions. Especially important among these are: the spectator's
knowledge of the contest and the inherent dangers to spectators
involved; the amount of attention the spectator gives to the
game at the time of injury; and the relative location of the
spectator in relation to the action of the event.
The court was also called upon this term to clarify the
phrase a "place of employment," as used in the safe-place stat-
ute. 7 In Barthel v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.," the em-
ployee of an independent contractor was injured when he came
into contact with defendant's electrical lines while installing
house trim. The employee sued the electric company alleging
a safe place violation. The company challenged the trial court
order overruling a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint. The
supreme court reversed.
On appeal, the issue was stated to be: whether the location
of electric company conductors and power lines on a residence
constituted a "place of employment," within the meaning of
Wisconsin Statutes section 101.01(2)(a).
The court related two elements which must be established
before a location will qualify as a place of employment:
16. For all practical purposes, the doctrine of implied assumption of risk was abol-
ished in Wisconsin by the case of McConville v. State Farm Mut. Inc. Co., 15 Wis. 2d
374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
17. Wis. STAT. § 101.01(2)(a) (1973):
The phrase "place of employment" includes every place, whether indoors or out
or underground and the premises appurtenant thereto where either temporarily
or permanently any industry, trade or business is carried on, or where any
process or operation, directly or indirectly related to any trade or business, is
carried on, and where any person is, directly or indirectly, employed by another
for direct or indirect gain or profit, but does not include any place where persons
are employed in (a) private domestic service which does not involve the use of
mechanical power or (b) farming.
18. 69 Wis. 2d 446, 230 N.W.2d 863 (1975).
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1. Business must be carried on there; and
2. A person must be employed on the premises.'9
The initial element was easily satisfied. The court reasoned
that as the statute required only that "any process or operation
directly or indirectly related to any industry, trade or business
[be] carried on . . . "10 the transmission of electrical power
through lines at the location was a sufficient connecting factor
to find that business was carried on at the location.
The latter element presented a more difficult question.
Plaintiff argued that the presence of an employed person on the
premises at the time of the accident-namely the plaintiff as
an employee of an independent contractor-should be viewed
as demonstrating the requisite presence. The court rejected
this contention and referred the plaintiff to prior rulings that
an employee of an independent contractor on the premises was
not a "person employed on the premises," within the meaning
of the statute.2 '
As a second theory, plaintiff argued that the sporadic and
temporary presence of power company employees at the loca-
tion of the electrical lines established the necessary employ-
ment relation under the safe-place statute. In support of this
contention, plaintiff offered Bellart v. Martell.2 2 Martell ex-
pressed the general proposition that the presence of an em-
ployee at the location involved need not be continuous. In
Martell, an electrician was injured at the defendant's plant. No
one had been employed at the plant for at least two months
prior to the accident, nor had any others worked there for sev-
eral months subsequent to the occurrence of plaintiff's injury.
Nonetheless, the plant site was found to be a place of employ-
ment at the time of the accident.23 To distinguish Martell, the
court explained that:
19. Wittka v. Hartnell, 46 Wis. 2d 374, 380, 175 N.W.2d 248, 252 (1970); Cross v.
Leuenberger, 267 Wis. 232, 235-36, 65 N.W.2d 35, 66 N.W.2d 168 (1954).
20. Wis. STAT. § 101.01(2)(a) (1973).
21. Voeltzke v. Kenosha Memorial Hospital, 45 Wis. 2d 271, 280, 172 N.W.2d 673,
678 (1969); Nietezke v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc., 214 Wis. 441, 445, 253 N.W. 579
(1934).
22. 28 Wis. 2d 686, 137 N.W.2d 729 (1965).
23. The court in Martell stated: "It seems unreasonable, however, to deem that an
established place of employment ceases to be one where it is operated temporarily
without the existence of any employment relationship, but without other significant
change." Bellart v. Martell, 28 Wis. 2d 686, 691, 137 N.W.2d 729, 732 (1965).
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Its holding is limited to the proposition that an established
place of employment does not cease to be one where it is
temporarily operated without an employee but with no other
significant change. Power company's lines and conductors
alleged in the present case to be a place of employment have
never been established as such. 4
Barthel sheds new light upon the import of the phrase
"place of employment." Henceforth, if a place is one in which
active employment is normally carried on, the fact that tempo-
rarily there is no such activity will not preclude the location
from falling within the statute. A place will also be embraced
within the statute during those times when an employee of the
company charged with the duty of maintaining the location is
actually working on the premises. Outside the statutory scope
are those locations whose only employment connection is the
normal but periodic presence of a company employee.
B. Products Liability
The Wisconsin Supreme Court again considered the ques-
tion of "unreasonably dangerous '2 5 products in Arbet v.
Gussarson21 and Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum
Swimming Pool Co..2
Arbet introduces the complexities of automobile crashwor-
thiness into Wisconsin jurisprudence. The Arbets were injured
when their American Motors car was struck from behind by
another motorist. The force of the crash compacted the body
and frame, jamming the doors tightly shut. The gas tank rup-
tured, spewing fuel onto the highway. Flames which fed on the
spilled gasoline melted a gasoline vent container constructed of
plastic which the defendant manufacturer had located inside
the passenger compartment. Once the container was breached,
24. 69 Wis. 2d at 453, 230 N.W.2d 863 at 867.
25. That the product be "unreasonably dangerous" is but one element necessary
for a cause of action in products liability. In Wisconsin, in a suit for products liability,
a plaintiff must prove (1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the
possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause (substantial factor) of the plaintiff's
injuries or damages, (4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling such product,
and (5) that the product was one which the seller expected to and did reach the user
or consumer without substantial change in the condition it was when he sold it. Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
26. 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
27. 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
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the fire spread through the interior of the auto, severely burn-
ing the occupants.
Plaintiffs complained that the automobile had been negli-
gently and defectively designed, claiming defects in the design
of the gas tank and doors, through selection of plastic as a
material for the vent container, the choice of the passenger
compartment as a point of location for the container, and fail-
ure to test the product, establish quality controls in its produc-
tion or extend warning to potential users of the hidden dangers
of the design.
Relating the rule of Dippel v. Sciano,28 the supreme court
instructed:
[W]here plaintiff shows that a manufacturer markets a
product in a "defective condition" which is "unreasonably
dangerous to the user," the manufacturer then has the bur-
den to prove lack of negligence.29
Thus, if the plaintiff had alleged facts showing the automobile
to be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous, the trial
court had improperly sustained defendant's demurrer. The
court so held.
The language of the complaint asserting defective design
rather than negligent manufacture did not render it demurra-
ble. A plaintiff might show, the court explained, that a defec-
tive product was "unreasonably dangerous" for strict liability
purposes where it was:
[D]angerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
templated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics. 30
To illustrate, the court suggested comparison of ordinary
expectations regarding large and small cars. The owner of a
Volkswagen would not be heard to complain that his car was
designed too small to be as safe as a Cadillac in a collision. The
smallness of the Volkswagen was a condition apparent to all
which would not per se render the auto inherently dangerous.
On the other hand, if the Volkswagen contained a dangerously
28. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
29. 66 Wis. 2d at 555-56, 225 N.W.2d at 434.
30. 66 Wis. 2d at 557, 225 N.W.2d at 435 (1975), citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 402A Comment i.
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defective condition, such as, perhaps, a plastic vent container,
whose presence an ordinary consumer would not reasonably
expect, the condition would be actionable. Thus, the present
complaint alleging latent defects of design, unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer, which were not the subject of
a manufacturer's warning, stated facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action in strict products liability.
In Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming
Pool Co. ,3 the plaintiff-appellant, age two, fell into an above-
ground swimming pool in his grandparent's backyard. The pool
was fitted with a retractable ladder, but it had been left down.
The child's lengthy immersion resulted in severe brain damage
and permanent disabilities.
The plaintiff stated his claim in strict liability and negli-
gence theorizing the manufacturer's liability from a failure to
equip the pool with a self-closing, self-latching gate which
would have prevented access from the ladder even when it was
in its down position. The trial court sustained a demurrer to
the complaint and entered an order dismissing the claim.
Affirming the order, the supreme court found the pool not
defective as a matter of law. Even assuming that the design of
the pool was marked by a defective condition, however, the
plaintiff would still be required to show that the condition was
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.
[T]he test in Wisconsin of whether a product contains an
unreasonably dangerous defect depends upon the reasonable
expectations of the ordinary consumer concerning the charac-
teristics of this type of product. If the average consumer
would reasonably anticipate the dangerous condition of the
product and fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it
would not be unreasonably dangerous and defective. This is
an objective test and is not dependent upon the knowledge
of the particular injured consumer, although his knowledge
may be evidence of contributory negligence under the cir-
cumstances.2
Thus, the absence of a gate at the head of the pool ladder
was an apparent condition not unreasonably dangerous be-
cause the average consumer would be completely aware of the
danger posed to small, unsupervised children by the inviting,
31. 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).




The Chief Justice, joined by Mr. Justice Heffernan, dis-
sented from this conclusion. The latent-patent distinction
wielded by the majority of the court as an absolute bar to the
plaintiff's action, argued the dissenters, was in fact but another
form of assumption of risk which should be treated as a matter
of contributory negligence and compared with the negligence
on the part of the manufacturer.3
The dissent drew heavily upon the recent companion cases
of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,34 and Luque v. McLean," ap-
parently impressed with the rationale of the California court.
Through these decisions the California Supreme Court held
that under the law of that state a strict liability plaintiff need
only plead and prove that he was injured by a defect in the
product while he used it in an intended manner. If the defen-
dant could show that the particular danger of the product was
unreasonable, that was a matter of contributory negligence
sometimes denominated assumption of the risk which would
not affect the character of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Pre-
cisely how the plaintiff was to prove this streamlined concept
of defect, however, was only obliquely revealed.
The primary objection of the Cronin court centered on the
"unreasonably dangerous" language contained in Comment i.
to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second. The ordi-
nary consumer test set forth in that Comment, they contended,
resembled a negligence standard in its tenor and required that
the plaintiff prove the qualities of the product to be dangerous
upon a reasonable man standard. It was reasoned also that the
showing of unreasonable danger substantially duplicated the
accomplishment of an injured consumer who had established
a defect in the product.
Accepting this interpretation of the Restatement rule, the
Wisconsin dissenters concluded "that the obviousness of a de-
fect is not a total bar to recovery, but merely a matter pertain-
ing to contributory negligence."36
In another case this term the court considered the question
of the proper statute of limitations to apply in an action
33. 69 Wis. 2d at 334, 230 N.W.2d at 800 (1975).
34. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972).
35. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d 1163 (1972).
36. Vincer v. Esther Williams, 69 Wis. 2d 326, 336, 230 N.W.2d 794, 800 (1975)
(dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 59
1976] TERM OF THE COURT 4291
brought by the special administrator of an estate for pain and
suffering of the decedent and for wrongful death against an
officer-director of the decedent's employer. In Ortman v. Jen-
sen and Johnson, Inc. ,7 two employees were killed in 1969 when
a concrete retaining wall collapsed. The actions originally
named the design engineer of the project as defendant but were
amended in 1973 to include the officer-director.38 The officer
demurred, alleging that the three-year statute of limitations
applying to wrongful death actions had lapsed.3 9 In addition,
he asserted that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The trial court sustained the demurrer solely on the basis that
the statute of limitations had lapsed."
Two issues were presented on appeal: did the amended
complaints state causes of action against the officer and were
the causes of action barred by the statute of limitations? The
supreme court, while affirming the trial court decision, did so
on the basis that no cause of action was stated rather than the
37. 66 Wis. 2d 508, 225 N.W.2d 635 (1975).
38. Wis. STAT. § 102.29 (1973) allows the maker of a claim for compensation to
maintain an action against any other party for the injury or death that was the basis
of the claim for compensation.
39. Wis. STAT. § 893.205(2) (1973):
Within 3 years: (1) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person for
such injuries sustained on and after July 1, 1955, unless notice in writing as
provided in s. 330.19(5), 1955 statutes, was served prior to July 1, 1959, in which
event s. 330.19(5), 1955 statutes, shall apply. But no action to recover damages
for injuries to the person, received without this state, shall be brought in any
court in this state when such action is barred by any statute of limitations of
actions of the state or country in which such injury was received unless the
person so injured shall, at the time of such injury, have been a resident of this
state.
(2) An action brought to recover damages for death caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of another where death resulted on or after July 1, 1955.
(3) Any civil action arising under ch. 11.
40. The trial court held that the six year statute of limitations within Wis. STAT. §
102.29(5) (1973) was not applicable. Wis. STAT. § 102.29(5) (1973) provides:
(5) If the insurance carrier of the employer and of the third party are the
same or if there is common control of the insurer of each, and the insurer fails
to commence a third party action, within the 3 years allowed by s. 893.205, the
3-year statute of limitations in s. 893.205 shall not be pleaded as a bar in any
action commenced by the injured employe herein against any such third party
subsequent to 3 years from the date of injury, but prior to 6 years from such date
of injury, provided that any recovery in such action shall be limited to the
insured liability of the third party. In any such action commenced by the injured
employe subsequent to the 3-year period, the insurance carrier of the employer
shall forfeit all right to participate in such action as a complainant and to
recover any payments made under the workmen's compensation act. This
subsection shall not apply if the insurance carrier has complied with sub. (4).
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statute of limitations had lapsed. The appellants had premised
each cause of action against the officer on either a safe place
violation or negligence in his capacity as supervisor. In holding
that no cause of action was stated, the court relied on Kruse v.
Schieve4' which set two requirements for bringing a suit against
an officer or director of a corporation. Kruse held that in such
actions it must affirmatively appear that the action was
brought against the officer in his capacity as a co-employee.
Second, Kruse held that the action must allege affirmative acts
on the part of the officer or director, in his role of co-employee,
which increased the risk of injury to the injured employee."
The rationale of Kruse was that an employee should not be able
to use section 102.29, the third-party liability section, to sue an
officer of his employer, and thereby circumvent the employer's
immunity." Applying the Kruse criteria to Ortman, the court
held that no cause of action was stated because there was no
allegation of any affirmative act of negligence on the part of the
officer which increased the risk of injury to the employees.
As to the issue of the statute of limitations, the supreme
court stated that the trial court had erred. Appellants alleged
that at the time of the accident, the officer was personally
insured for injury and death caused by his negligence by the
same insurance company that was the employer's workmen's
compensation carrier. Appellants had notified the employer
and the insurance company of their intent to sue the project
designer in 1970, but at no time did the insurance company
notify appellants that it was also the officer's personal insur-
ance carrier. Appellants, therefore contended that the action
came within the purview of Wisconsin Statutes section
102.29(5) which provides for an extended period of limita-
tions.44 The officer insisted that Wisconsin Statutes section
893.20511 controlled, contending that he was not a "third party"
41. 61 Wis. 2d 421, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973).
42. 66 Wis. 2d at 514, 225 N.W.2d at 639.
43. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1973) of the Workmen's Compensation Chapter pro-
vides: "Where such conditions exist the right to the recovery of compensation pursuant
to this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and the workmen's
compensation carrier."
44. Wis. STAT. § 102.29(5) (1973) applies when the insurance carriers of the em-
ployer and the third party are the same company. If the insurer fails to commence a
third party action or notify the parties in interest of the situation within the time
allowed for bringing a personal injury action, it is barred from pleading § 893.205 as
an affirmative defense until six years from the date of the injury.
45. Wis. STAT. § 893.205(2) (1973).
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within the meaning of section 120.29(5). The officer argued
that an officer of an employer could not be sued as a third party
under section 102.29(5) if the claim was based on a safe place
violation.46 Acknowledging this, the court again reiterated that
an officer can be sued under the common law standard of care
if the Kruse requirements were met. Relying on Kruse the court
held the officer was not a third party under section 102.29 as
no affirmative acts of negligence were alleged against him. This
finding did not militate against the appellants as the case was
remanded and appellants given leave to plead further.
The officer also contended that section 102.29(5) should not
apply as the action was not commenced by the "injured em-
ployee" as required by that section. The court was asked to
determine whether the phrase "commenced by the injured
employee" in section 102.29(5) precluded the bringing of
wrongful death and survival actions. The court answered in the
negative. It first reasoned that section 102.29(5) specifically
referred to the entire three-year statute of limitations, 7 which
covered both personal injury and wrongful death actions. Thus,
it concluded both wrongful death and survival action could be
brought under section 102.29(5). Secondly, the court reasoned
that if the statute was construed as not to apply to wrongful
death and survival actions, it would bar recovery for the more
serious injury, i.e., death, while permitting recovery for lesser
injuries. The court asserted that this would be an absurd result.
It also reasoned that the insured would not be harmed by the
operation of the statute as recovery is limited to the insurance
coverage .48
Ortman accomplished two things. It reaffirmed the Kruse
requirements for an employee to sue an officer or director as a
third party under section 102.29. That is, the action must be
brought against the officer in his capacity as co-employee and
that the acts on which the action is based must be affirmative
acts which increase the risk of injury to the employee commit-
ted by the officer in his capacity as co-employee. Secondly,
Ortman asserted that wrongful death and survival actions do
come within the purview of section 102.29(5).
46. See Anderson v. Green Bay Hockey, Inc., 56 Wis. 2d 763, 203 N.W.2d 79 (1973);
Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615, 201 N.W.2d 52 (1972).
47. Wis. STAT. § 893.205 (1973).




In Calero v. Del Chemical Corp.," the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reviewed a defamation suit brought by an employee
against his former employer for alleged defamatory communi-
cations made to prospective employers. Plaintiff, Calero, was
employed by the defendant-corporation first as an accountant
and later as director of purchasing. During this employment,
he designed an index file of purchasing records. After a disa-
greement with the corporation president, the plaintiff resigned,
but was asked to remain an additional week to train a replace-
ment. During this period, the corporate president heard
through office rumors that the plaintiff was about to form a
competing corporation and was "helping himself" to corporate
files, copying the purchasing records and attempting to hire
away co-employees. The president had no personal knowledge
of the truth of these rumors. Plaintiff testified that he told the
president that he was copying the purchasing records at the
request of a branch manager.
The alleged defamatory communications occurred during
plaintiff's subsequent attempts to obtain employment. Shortly
after finding another job, plaintiff was being considered for a
promotion, but after contacting the defendant-corporation's
president about plaintiff's work history, the plaintiff's employ-
ment was terminated. In later years, three companies which
requested information about plaintiff's work history received
reports from the defendant-corporation that the plaintiff was
dismissed for " 'helping' himself to confidential corporate re-
cords . ..and attempting to hire away from us various key
personnel.""0 On another occasion, when asked for a character
evaluation, defendant responded, "Yes-he was something of
a character." 5' The jury found that these oral and written com-
munications were defamatory and plaintiff was entitled to
damages of $19,000.
In the supreme court's affirmance of this holding, it is im-
portant to note that the corporation's defense was based on a
conditional privilege. Conditional privileges are immunities
from liability for defamation which in the interest of the free
49. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
50. Id. at 494-95, 228 N.W.2d at 742.
51. Id. Calero never listed the defendant as a reference, but simply as a previous
employer.
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flow of information allow statements to be made without mal-
ice in certain circumstances even at the risk of causing harm
by defamation.2 There are two types of conditional privileges,
constitutional and nonconstitutional. 53 A constitutional condi-
tional privilege arises in a situation involving the media, a
"matter of public interest" 4 and a public official or public
figure." On the other hand, nonconstitutional conditional priv-
ileges arise in cases involving purely private matters between
private individuals. 5
It is important to distinguish between these two types of
conditional privileges in order to determine what test of malice
and what standard of evidence the court will apply in deter-
mining liability. Fundamental first amendment considerations
which arise from a fear of a chilling effect on free expression
determine the standards applicable to constitutional condi-
tional privileges. The supreme court has articulated an "actual
malice" or constitutional test, i.e., the statement must be
made with knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of
the truth.51 In cases involving nonconstitutional conditional
privileges, however, the plaintiff must show simply that the
defendant acted with "express" or "common-law" malice, i.e.,
ill will, envy, spite, revenge. 5
On appeal, the defendants' first contention was that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the quantum of
proof necessary to overcome the conditional privilege extended
to defendants. The defendants argued, relying on Polzin v.
Helmbrecht, 9 that "instead of applying the minimal greater
weight standard the trial court should have applied the middle-
level clear and convincing test.""0 The supreme court pointed
52. Lathan v. Journal Co., 30 Wis. 2d 146, 152, 140 N.W. 2d 417 (1966). Partial
defenses to defamation suits which have also been recognized are retraction, an already
bad reputation, and provocation. See generally W. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS, p. 796-801
(4th ed. 1971).
53. W. Prosser, LAw OF TORTS, p. 785, 819 (4th ed. 1971).
54. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971); Polzin v. Helmbrecht,
54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972).
55. The ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) applied to
public officials but was extended to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Goldberg, J. concurring).
57. Id. at 279-80.
58. Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d 578, 587-88, 196 N.W.2d 685, 690-91 (1972).
See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
59. 54 Wis. 2d 578, 587-88, 196 N.W.2d 685, 690-91 (1972).
60. 68 Wis. 2d at 504, 228 N.W.2d at 747.
19761
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
out, however, that the Polzin case involved a letter to a news-
paper editor about a political controversy and, thus, fell within
the area of constitutional conditional privileges. The holding in
Polzin coupled the clear and convincing standard with the con-
stitutional "actual malice" test enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in the New York Times case. In Calero,
where no first amendment constitutional considerations were
involved, the quantum of proof necessary was the greater
weight of the evidence.
The defendants' next contention was that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury as to the proper test applicable to
determine if punitive damages should be awarded. Defendants
relied on Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.," where the United States
Supreme Court held that punitive damages could not be re-
covered under the greater weight test, but could only be re-
covered when the Times knowing-or-reckless-falsity test was
met by evidence of convincing clarity. However, the Court also
held that in cases involving constitutional conditional privi-
leges and private individuals rather than public officials or
figures, "the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defama-
tory falsehood"62 in the area of nonpunitive damages. In Calero,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted Gertz as holding
that only in the constitutional privilege area must actual mal-
ice be demonstrated to recover punitive damages. In cases of
nonconstitutional conditional privilege, like Calero, the Wis-
consin court held that the states may define the appropriate
standard of liability for punitive damages. Thus, the court af-
firmed plaintiff-Calero's recovery of punitive damages under
the express malice standard.
Finally, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury as to the quantum of proof necessary to
satisfy the test for allowance of punitive damages. While the
defendants' previous contention questioned whether the stan-
dard of actual or express malice should be applied to determine
if punitive damages should be awarded, the defendant now
argued that punitive damages cannot be recovered under a
greater weight standard of proof. The court summarily rejected
this contention, noting that there was no matter of public con-
61. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
62. Id. at 347.
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cern, no public official or figure, and no media involved in this
fact situation and, therefore, first amendment principles did
not dictate the application of the clear and convincing stan-
dard. "To recover punitive damage in this ordinary common-
law private libel action, the plaintiff must show express malice
by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury was so instructed
and so found."63
In Meyer v. Ewald,6" the court cleared up some misleading
language used in the malicious prosecution case of Gladfelter
v. Doemel65 In Meyer, the plaintiff sued a corporate car dealer
for malicious prosecution.
The six essential elements in an action for malicious prose-
cution are:
1. There must have been a prior institution or continuation
of some regular judicial proceedings against the plaintiff in
this action for malicious prosecution.
2. Such former proceedings must have been by, or at the
instance of the defendant in this action for malicious prosecu-
tion.
3. The former proceedings must have terminated in favor of
the defendant therein, the plaintiff in the action for malicious
prosecution.
4. There must have been malice in instituting the former
proceedings.
5. There must have been want of probable cause for the
institution of the former proceedings.
6. There must have been injury or damage resulting to the
plaintiff from the former proceedings.66
The trial court entered judgment dismissing the complaint. On
appeal, the defendant-respondent argued that there was no
malice or lack of probable cause in instituting the criminal
proceeding. The dismissal was affirmed because no lack of
probable cause in initiating the action was present.
A dismissal of a criminal prosecution has been considered
prima facie evidence of a lack of probable cause. 7 However, an
exception has been found when the action was brought on the
advice of an attorney after full and fair disclosure to him. Act-
63. 68 Wis. 2d at 506, 228 N.W.2d at 748.
64. 66 Wis. 2d 168, 224 N.W.2d 419 (1974).
65. 2 Wis. 2d 635, 87 N.W.2d 490 (1958).
66. Elmer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 257 Wis. 228, 231, 43 N.W.2d 244, 246 (1950).
67. 66 Wis. 2d at 179, 224 N.W.2d at 425.
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ing on the attorney's advice has afforded the defendant a com-
plete defense as a matter of law."8 Plaintiff attempted to over-
come this exception by contending that when malice is found
in a malicious prosecution action, the defense of full and fair
disclosure is destroyed. This proposition was based on language
in Gladfelter v. Doemel:"1
The reason why a verdict cannot be directed in favor of the
defendant on the issue of fair disclosure and reliance upon the
advice of counsel, where there is evidence present from which
a jury might infer malice, is because malice destroys such
defense. 70
In refusing to overturn the decision of the trial court, the
supreme court withdrew the statement "malice destroys such
defense" from Gladfelter. The court reasoned that when the
quote was read as contended by the plaintiff, it was not only
out of context,7 but in conflict with Hajic v. Novitzke2 and as
such, misleading. In Hajic, while the finding of malice was left
undisturbed, the court had held that full and fair disclosure to
counsel and proceeding on the advice of counsel compelled the
conclusion that defendants had probable cause to institute the
criminal proceeding.
IV. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A. Accrual of Cause of Action
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Osborn Plumbing & Heat-
ing, Inc. ,73 the plaintiff paid a claim on a policy of fire insurance
and became subrogated to the rights of its insured. The 1970
fire which damaged the insured's structure allegedly began in
a heating unit which was installed in 1962. The insurer com-
menced action in January of 1971 against the heater's manu-
facturer, the heating contractor, the maintenance firm which
serviced the heater and the architects who approved its in-
stallation. The defendants answered, denying negligence, and
cross-complained against one another for contribution. The
68. Neumann v. Industrial Sound Engineering, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 471, 477, 143
N.W.2d 543, 546 (1966).
69. 2 Wis. 2d 635, 87 N.W.2d 490 (1958).
70. Id. at 642, 87 N.W.2d at 494.
71. 66 Wis. 2d at 181-82, 224 N.W.2d at 426.
72. 46 Wis. 2d 402, 416, 175 N.W.2d 193, 200 (1970), citing Neumann v. Industrial
Sound Engineering, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 471, 478, 143 N.W.2d 543, 546-547 (1966).
73. 66 Wis. 2d 454, 225 N.W.2d 628 (1975).
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architects raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense to the plaintiff's complaint, and answered the cross-
complaints of the other defendants denying negligence and
denying that the other defendants were entitled to contribu-
tion.
A motion for summary judgment was made by the archi-
tects, who sought dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint and the
cross-complaints of the other defendants. In granting the mo-
tion, the trial court found that the plaintiff insurer's claim was
barred by section 893.19(5) of the Wisconsin Statutes. 7 The
trial court found further that since the statute of limitations
had run before the fire, there was no common liability at that
time, and that the other defendants were therefore not entitled
to contribution from the architects.
The heating contractor appealed from the summary judg-
ment and from denial of a motion to reconsider, asserting first
that the trial court had erred in determining that it was not
entitled to contribution because the statute of limitations had
run, and second, that the architects had waived the affirmative
defense of the statute of limitations as to the cross-complaints.
The supreme court reversed the grant of summary judgment,
holding that the respondent architects had not demonstrated
that the plaintiff's cause of action had been barred prior to the
fire,75 and that the trial court's finding of no common liability
between the architects and the other defendants was therefore
erroneous. As to the second point raised by the appellant con-
tractor, the court held that the architects had waived the stat-
ute of limitations defense to the appellant's cross-complaint
through their course of pleading.76
74. The architects had originally claimed that the cause of action was barred by
Wis. STAT. § 893.155 (1973), which provides that actions against persons furnishing
design or supervision of the construction of improvements to real property must be
brought within six years of performance and completion of construction. The trial court
found the statute to be unconstitutional and applied Wis. STAT. § 893.19(5) (1973)
which governs actions to recover damages for injury to property. Wis. STAT. § 893.155
(1973) was found unconstitutional by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kallas Millwork
Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
75. Common liability is to be determined at the date of the accident. If there is
common liability at that time, the right to contribution will not be defeated if the
common liability is extinguished as to one of the joint tortfeasors. State Farm Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W.2d 425 (1953).
76. The architects interposed answers to the cross-complaints, but did not assert
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in those answers. The court stated
that cross-complaints were automatically deemed controverted, but that an answer to
it was permissible. However, the court held that when an answer is made to a cross-
complaint, the answerer waives any affirmative defense he has not pleaded.
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In its discussion of the contribution issue, the Hartford
court reviewed Wisconsin case law and quoted a previous deci-
sion77 which stated:
The basic elements of contribution as applied to negligence
cases are: 1. Both parties must be jointly negligent wrong-
doers; 2. they must have common liability because of such
negligence to the same person; 3. one such party must have
borne an unequal proportion of the common burden. 8
The court briefly discussed elements 1 and 3, above, and deter-
mined that the pleadings and affidavits in the case did not
demonstrate a conclusive lack of either element. Thus, in order
for the cross-complaints to be dismissed, the element of com-
mon liability would have to be found lacking. The supreme
court agreed with the trial court's belief that, if the statute of
limitations had barred the plaintiff's claim before the fire
which produced the damages complained of, there would have
been no common liability, and thus no right to contribution.
However, the supreme court disagreed with the finding that the
statute of limitations had run before the fire.
Since the fire occurred on April 15, 1970, the court was faced
only with the necessity of determining whether the plaintiff's
cause of action against the architects accrued, and set the limi-
tation period into motion, before April 15, 1964. The trial court
and the respondent architects placed reliance on Milwaukee
County v. Schmidt, Garden & Erikson" for the proposition that
a cause of action for an architect's malpractice accrues at the
time of the architect's negligent conduct regarding design or
construction. In Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, the court quoted
the trial court's conclusion that "the cause of action either
arises from an act or omission in design or an act or omission
in the supervision of the construction."8
The appellant contractor, however, cited Holifield v. Setco
Industries, Inc.8" in support of its argument that the cause of
action did not accrue until the fire occurred in 1970. The Wis-
consin court held in Holifield that a cause of action in a prod-
ucts liability case does not arise until an injury is suffered
77. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 512, 515,
99 N.W.2d 746, 748 (1959).
78. 66 Wis. 2d at 460, 225 N.W.2d at 631.
79. 43 Wis. 2d 445, 168 N.W.2d 559 (1969).
80. 43 Wis. 2d at 451-52, 168 N.W.2d at 562.
81. 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).
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which "sets in force and operation the factors that create and
establish the basis for a claim of damages. '8 2 Thus, in
Holifield, the cause of action accrued not at the time the defec-
tive grinding wheel was manufactured, but at the time it ex-
ploded and mortally injured its operator.
While the Hartford court found it unnecessary to determine
whether the plaintiffs cause of action accrued at the time of
the fire,83 the proposition that it accrued at the time of design
or approval of installation was specifically rejected. The court
indicated that the case at bar was "more similar" to Holifield
than to Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, and also cited the recent
case of Rosenthal v. Kurtz."' In the latter case, it was held that
the plaintiffs cause of action against an architect arose when
the ceiling the architect designed sagged and threatened to
collapse, the court stating:
[U]nder the law of torts of this state, a defect of design or
construction does not ripen into an accrued cause of action
until the injury is inflicted or the damage incurred.,
By citing Holifield with approval, the Hartford court reaf-
firmed the rule that some actual harm must result from an
architect's negligence before a cause of action against him ac-
crues; negligent design or supervision, without more, is not
sufficient. 8
B. Imputed Negligence
In White v. Lunder,87 the court considered a question which
by its own admission was not contemplated by the terms of the
82. 42 Wis. 2d at 756, 168 N.W.2d at 180.
83. The architects' original services were finished when construction was com-
pleted in 1962, and they were not contacted again by the plaintiff until 1968, when a
weld cracked on a part of the heating unit. No evidence of any injury prior to 1968 was
presented. Since the court was concerned only with possible accrual of a cause of action
prior to mid-April 1964, it was apparently not felt necessary to closely consider events
transpiring thereafter.
84. 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W.2d 741, 216 N.W.2d 252 (1974).
85. 62 Wis. 2d at 7, 213 N.W.2d at 743-44.
86. In its discussion of Milwaukee County v. Schmidt, Garden & Erikson, 35 Wis.
2d 33, 150 N.W.2d 354 (1967), the Hartford court noted that the architects in the
previous case had been apprised of the plaintiffs dissatisfaction with the heating
system which was the subject of litigation about the time construction was being
completed. Thus it appears that actual injury was inflicted in that case when the
defendant architects were still providing supervisory services.
87. 66 Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).
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comparative negligence statute.8 The issue was whether, in a
husband's action to recover for medical expenses and for loss
of consortium, the negligence of the spouses should be com-
bined for purposes of comparing negligence with that of the
third party where a wife sustains bodily injury by reason of the
causal negligence of herself, her husband and the third party.
Resolution of the issue required a determination as to whether
the husband's causes of action were derivative.
The plaintiff, White, his wife and the defendant, Lunder,
attended a boating party on two boats anchored in the middle
of Lake Winnegago. Lunder was on the White boat when Mr.
White told him to start it. As the motor started, White's wife,
who was in the process of climbing aboard, was thrown back
into the propeller and was injured. She sued the defendant for
her personal injuries, and her husband sued for loss of consor-
tium and medical expenses. The jury apportioned thirty-three
percent of the causal negligence to White, thirty percent to his
wife and thirty-seven percent to Lunder. The trial court, find-
ing the combined negligence of the husband and wife to be
sixty-three percent, thereby exceeding the causal negligence of
the defendant, dismissed the husband's causes of action.
In reversing the trial court's decision, the supreme court
held that, while the causes of action were derivative, such find-
ing did not necessarily require the conclusion that the negli-
gence of the spouses should therefore be combined. In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted that, of the principal cases
considering the derivative issue, none of them involved a situa-
tion where, as in the Lunder situation, both the injured spouse
and the spouse suing for loss of consortium and medical expen-
ses were contributorily negligent. 9 This fact was of critical sig-
nificance, for in absence of contributory negligence on the part
of the recovering spouse, a finding that the cause of negligence
was derivative had never presented a conclusion which con-
flicted with the provisions of the comparative negligence stat-
ute. The conflict can be summarized as follows. Under the
comparative negligence statute, partial recovery is prohibited
only when the negligence of the claimant is greater than that
of the person against whom he seeks recovery. Under a deriva-
88. Id. at 575, 225 N.W.2d at 449.
89. Id. at 571, 225 N.W.2d at 447.
90. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1973):
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tive cause of action, the claimant takes his cause of action
subject to all defenses as they exist against the injured spouse.9 '
Thus, in the pre-Lunder cases where the claiming spouse was
not contributorily negligent, if the contributory negligence of
the injured spouse exceeded that of the third party, the claim-
ing spouse, consistent with the comparative negligence provi-
sion and the theory of derivative actions, could not recover.
Likewise, where the contributory negligence of the injured
spouse was less than that of the third party, the claiming
spouse could recover. However, in Lunder, both spouses were
contributorily negligent. Further, the percentage of causal neg-
ligence of each spouse when considered separately was less
than that of the third party and when considered aggregately
was more than that of the third party. The court, in recognizing
their dilemma, stated that:
[tio allow no recovery to the husband where, as here, the
third party tortfeasor was more causally negligent than he,
not only seems to be unjust but is not entirely consistent with
our comparative negligence statute . . . . Likewise, it seems
unjust for the husband to collect damages upon a formula
that disregards either his causal negligence or that of his
injured wife.9
In resolving the problem, the court adopted what it referred to
as a "workable construction." The rule in derivative actions as
adopted by the court is:
[W]here the causal negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought is greater than either the husband or wife
can be accomplished by reducing the entire award for both
medical expenses and loss of consortium by the percentage of
negligence attributed to the injured spouse; and further re-
ducing the entire award by the percentage of causal negli-
gence attributable to the claiming spouse. 3
In cases where the causal negligence of the claiming spouse is
Contributory negligence. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negli-
gence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence
was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
91. 66 Wis. 2d at 571, 225 N.W.2d at 447.
92. Id. at 575, 225 N.W.2d at 449.
93. Id. at 575-76, 225 N.W.2d at 449.
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greater than the person against whom the claim is made, recov-
ery will be denied because of the comparative negligence stat-
ute. 4 Where the causal negligence of the injured spouse is
greater than that of the person against whom recovery is
sought, recovery will be denied because of the derivative nature
of the action. 5
A question raised by Lunder concerns its effect on other
derivative actions, especially as between parent and child. The
similarity in the relationship was noted by the court in Lunder:
The parent is by law required to support and care for his
child. In return for the performance of such obligation, the
law gives to the parent the right to a part of the child's cause
of action. . . So, also since the husband is required to sup-
port his wife, the law likewise gives him a part of the wife's
cause of action. . . . This splitting up . . . is due solely to
the parental and marital relation existing between the par-
ties. 6
It would, therefore, seem that the rule of Lunder will be applied
to the parent-child situation in actions by the parent to recover
medical expenses incurred when the child is injured by the
negligence of a third party. Likewise, because the cause of ac-
tion for loss of consortium is very similar to the cause of action
for loss of society and companionship of a child,9" Lunder
should also apply in this situation.
V. DAMAGES
Parents, in Wisconsin, may now recover damages for loss of
aid, comfort, society and companionship of a minor child who
has been injured by the negligence of a third person. This new
developement in Wisconsin tort law came in the case of
Shockley v. Prier." (Discussion of Shockley will be abbreviated
as a more detailed analysis can be found at 59 MARQ. L. REV.
169.)
The rule prior to Shockley was that when a minor child was
94. Id. at 576, 225 N.W.2d at 450.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 567, 225 N.W.2d at 444-45, citing Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188
Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198 (1925).
97. The only substantial difference between the actions is that the action for loss
of consortium includes sexual companionship and marital services. Ballard v. Lumber-
mens Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 148 N.W.2d 65 (1967).
98. 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975).
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injured by the negligence of another, parents could recover only
reasonable medical and nursing expenses and loss of the child's
earnings during minority. 9 The decision in Shockley was based
on a realistic outlook of the parent-child relationship. The,
court noted that in the majority of family situations children
are no longer economic assets but sources of great expenditure.
The purpose of tort law, the court reasoned, is to compensate
injuries as those injuries are understood in light of changing
social and economic conditions. Today, the injury sustained by
a parent on the death or injury of its child is more than an
economic one.' 0 The court recognized the need to remedy men-
tal and emotional injury to the parents. The court noted that
the blindness of the minor would have a shattering effect on the
relationship between him and his parents, with resulting loss
of the enjoyment of experiences normally shared by parents
and children. The court also reasoned that the Wisconsin
Wrongful Death Statute'0' recognized the loss of society and
companionship as an element of damages, therefore, it was
reasonable to recognize the same type of loss for injury to a
minor child.'0 2
The question of prejudgment interest was reviewed by the
court in the case of Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. v. Royal Elec-
tric Mfg. Co., Inc. 10 3 A property owner sued a manufacturer and
two subcontractors for damages to his property caused during
the installation of equipment. The damage question in the spe-
cial verdict was answered by the trial court pursuant to a stipu-
lation between the parties.' 4 There was no attempt to prove
damages at the trial and the issue of prejudgment interest was
99. Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 380, 206 N.W.2d 198, 200 (1925).
100. See 43 WASH. L. REv. 654, 655-58 (1967); Katz, Schroeder & Sidman,
Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211 (1973).
101. Wis. STAT. § 895.04(4) (1973):
(4) Judgment for damages for percuniary injury from wrongful death, and
additional damages not to exceed $5,000 for loss of society and companionship,
may be awarded to the spouse, unemancipated or dependent children or parents
of the deceased.
102. It must be noted that while there is a $5,000 limitation on recovery in wrongful
death cases, the court made no mention of any limitation in a personal injury case.
103. 66 Wis. 2d 577, 225 N.W.2d 648 (1975).
104. The record reflected a pertinent part of the stipulation:
THE COURT: It is stipulated by and between the parties to this action that
the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiffs, Wyandotte Chemical and
Centennial Insurance is $36,375.02, . .
66 Wis. 2d at 588, 225 N.W.2d at 654.
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not raised until motions after verdict. The trial court denied
the request for prejudgment interest, holding the damage issue
had been settled by stipulation. Judgment was entered for the
plaintiff but without any provision for prejudgment interest. In
support of its claim for prejudgment interest on appeal, the
plaintiff claimed the damages had become liquidated, certain
and capable of determination five years before the entry of
judgment.
Before the court addressed the facts of the instant case, it
made a thorough analysis of the prejudgment interest law in
Wisconsin. In Laycock v. Parker,'°5 the court broadened the
original notion that interest was recoverable only as a penalty
for a wrongdoer's refusal to pay legally due liquidated damages.
The court adopted the view that prejudgment interest should
be regarded not just as a penalty, but also as an element of
compensation. Laycock made recovery of prejudgment interest
available whenever the amount of damages was "determinable,
i.e., where 'there [was] a reasonably certain standard of mea-
surement by the correct application of which one can ascertain
'''100the amount he owes ....
Since Laycock, three separate approaches to the question of
prejudgment interest have developed. One approach allows
recovery of prejudgment interest while the other two deny it.
The court cited cases illustrative of each approach.
The first approach generally has presented situations in
which a determination of the amount owed seemed to be im-
possible. Recovery of prejudgment interest, however, may be
permitted because the court found some method by which the
withholding party could have determined the amount owed.107
Thus, in Necedah Mfg. Corp. v. Juneau County,' ° recovery was
permitted in a negligence suit for property destroyed by fire.
Although there was no other valid basis by which the value of
the property destroyed could be determined, the court found
that the withholding party could have used the tax values of
the property, as those amounts were essentially the same as the
values ultimately found by the jury.
The second approach involves cases in which the amount
105. 103 Wis. 161, 79 N.W. 327 (1899).
106. 66 Wis. 2d at 582, 225 N.W.2d at 651.
107. 66 Wis. 2d at 583, 225 N.W.2d at 652.
108. 206 Wis. 316, 237 N.W. 277 (1931).
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owed was "determinable" but recovery was denied because
some other factor prevented recovery of the amount to be tend-
ered. Factors upon which prejudgment interest have been de-
nied range from a dispute as to the constitutionality of the
statute upon which the claim was based, ' to a dispute as to
whether the law required a credit to a municipality on the
amount to be tendered."' City of Franklin v. Badger Ford
Truck Sales"' was another case in which the total amount to
be paid was "determinable" but another factor precluded re-
covery of prejudgment interest. In Franklin, as in the instant
matter, the plaintiff brought suit against three parties alleging
joint liability. The court denied prejudgment interest recovery
reasoning that it would have been impossible, prior to judg-
ment, for any individual party to determine the portion of the
claimed damages for which it was liable.
The third approach to prejudgment interest has involved
cases which recovery was denied for policy considerations. The
Wyandotte court noted that one such policy consideration has
been the discouragement of overstated claims.' Thus arose the
"genuine dispute" rule which denies prejudgment interest
when a claim has been substantially inflated and a genuine
dispute existed over the amount due."'
The Wyandotte court found a common thread running
through the three approaches to the question of prejudgment
interest. The court stressed that the decision of whether to
allow prejudgment interest extends further than the answer to
the question of whether the amount owed was determinable.
The court emphasized that the right to prejudgment interest
involved balancing the right of the injured party to full com-
pensation against the right of a withholding party to be free
from a claim for interest where his refusal to pay was legally
justifiable. Factors such as those in the above-mentioned cases
will determine which way the balancing process will tilt.
The plaintiff in Wyandotte argued that prejudgment inter-
109. Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).
110. State ex rel. Schilling & Klingler v. Baird, 65 Wis. 2d 394, 222 N.W.2d 666
(1974)."
111. 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
112. Congress Bar & Restr. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 42 Wis. 2d 56, 165 N.W.2d
409 (1969).




est should be allowed because the damages had become liquid-
able, certain and capable of determination five years before the
entry of judgment. The defendants rebutted by claiming that
the instant controversy was indistinguishable from Franklin.
The plaintiff asserted Franklin should be overruled as incon-
sistent with the Laycock policy of providing interest as an ele-
ment of compensation when damages were liquidable. The
court rejected this contention by emphasizing that the plain-
tiff's argument could only be justified by acceptance of the
view that the injured party's right to full compensation was the
paramount consideration in determining whether prejudgment
interest should be allowed.
The defendants also contended that the pretrial stipula-
tion" 4 precluded the plaintiff from recovering prejudgment
interest. The plaintiff argued that the stipulation was only an
acknowledgment by the defendants of the amount of reasona-
ble repair costs and was not intended to pre-empt additional
claims for interest. The issue was whether a stipulation as to
the amount of actual damages, without express reservation of
the claim for prejudgment interest, foreclosed a claim for such
interest asserted in the complaint and again after verdict. In
rejecting the plaintiff's argument that it did not, the court
relied on Kleinschmidt v. Aluminum & Bronze Foundry,"'
where a pretrial stipulation between the parties provided for a
third party to submit an appraisal for the.reasonable value of
the work done. The stipulation also provided that the parties
would accept the appraisal as the final settlement of the dam-
age issue. The court held the stipulation barred any subsequent
prejudgment interest recovery.
Although the language of the stipulations in
Kleinschmidt and the instant case was different, the court
held the cases were indistinguishable in principle. The court
noted that if and when prejudgment interest was recoverable,
it was only recoverable as an element of compensatory damages
and not as a separate penalty. Thus, the court reasoned the two
cases were indistinguishable in that the terms of both stipula-
114. 274 Wis. 231, 79 N.W.2d 802 (1956).
115. In Kleinschmidt, there was a pretrial stipulation which provided that a third
party should submit an appraisal of the fair and reasonable charge for the work done
and that the parties would accept the amount so designated as a final settlement of
the issue.
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tions purported to resolve the entire question of compensatory
damages despite the fact that neither stated specific items of
damages. The compensations given were held to have already
included a consideration of prejudgment interest.
Wyandotte clarified two important matters. First, it em-
phasized that the granting of prejudgment interest was not
solely based on the question of whether the amount of damages
was determinable. The court stressed that the granting of pre-
judgment interest was determined by a balancing of the injured
party's right to be fully compensated against the right of the
withholding party to be free from a claim for prejudgment in-
terest when his refusal to pay the claia was legally justified.
Second, Wyandotte made clear that a stipulation wh ich pur-
ports to resolve the entire damage question will preclude a
claim for prejudgment interest unless the stipulation makes




Ordinarily the breach of an oral promise to devise realty by
will is not grounds for imposing a constructive trust against a
promisor or his successor.' Such a decree would generally con-
stitute a violation of Wisconsin Statute section 853.06 which
requires a written instrument, signed by the testator and exe-
cuted in the presence of witnesses, to effectuate a transfer of a
decedent's property. 2 However, when the breach by a promisor
of an oral promise to devise results in unjust enrichment of the
actual devisee, the court may exercise its equitable authority
to impose a constructive trust in favor of the promisee. Utiliz-
ing this doctrine in Meyer v. Ludwig,3 the court unanimously
affirmed a trial court order imposing a constructive trust in
favor of the defendant-daughter on land willed to the plaintiff
by his deceased wife. The land had been orally promised to the
defendant over twenty years prior to this action. In reliance on
this promise, the defendant and her husband had significantly
1. BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 83, 85 (5th ed. 1973).
2. Wis. STAT. § 853.03 (1973).
3. 65 Wis. 2d 280, 222 N.W.2d 679 (1974).
